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Televising 9/11 and Its Aftermath: The Framing of
George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Politics of Good and Evil
Gary R. Edgerton, William B. Hart, and Frances Hassencahl
Abstract
For most of the four days following 9/11, TV viewers around the
world were mesmerised by unthinkable images. Television brought home
to Americans especially the polarising effects of the post-Cold War world,
including the backlash of Islamic fundamentalism and the imminent threat
of future terrorist attacks. A formulaic narrative quickly emerged; ordinary
police and firefighters took the lead as America’s national heroes, while
Osama bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda and the Taliban rose up as villains. On September 12, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush gave voice
to this mythic small-screen storyline as “a monumental struggle of good
and evil.” This chapter considers the ways in which television portrayed
the major events of September 11 and its aftermath. It examines Bush’s
main televised responses and the ways his administration’s faith-based
foreign policies were initially framed on TV. Bush’s evangelical Christian
background is examined, as is his subsequent political vision for waging
war on terrorism. Finally, representative telecasts, broader programming
patterns, and general viewing trends during the first six months following
the attacks are surveyed and summarised, as are the longer-term consequences of framing the global media event of September 11 in terms of
good and evil.
Key Words: al-Qaeda, O. bin Laden, G. W. Bush, presidential politics,
September 11, Taliban, television news

1.

Through a Lens, Darkly

Once upon a time, evil was personified. Evil was Mephistopheles or the
Devil. Colourfully costumed. Almost flavourful, altogether identifiable, a
clarified being from another world. But in the industrial system evil has
become systematized. The production of it has become technologized,
internationalized, multinationalized, and especially in times of war and
high zealotry, officially rhapsodized.
-Lionel Tiger 1
Americans are still trying to grasp the full meaning of the terrorist hijackings of September 11, 2001 that left more than 3,000 people from
61 countries dead at the World Trade Center’s twin towers in lower Manhattan, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a rural field in Pennsylvania. The initial shock of 9/11 sent stunning reverberations throughout
the nation where most citizens simply sat glued to their television sets,
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struggling to make sense of the horrific imagery that was beaming back at
them. To many, the telecast of September 11 and the first few days following the attacks resembled something akin to a summer disaster movie
rather than an actual occurrence unfolding in real time.
Two days after 9/11, Bill Moyers began a series of special 30minute interviews sponsored by public television, which explored the
broader psychological and theological ramifications of what he called an
event that had taken on “apocalyptic” significance. Produced in the Manhattan studios of Thirteen/WNET, Moyers first spoke with Andrew Delbanco, a Columbia humanities scholar and author of The Death of Satan:
How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil, about “why men do good”
(such as New York City’s firemen) and “evil” (the terrorists). Delbanco’s
main assertion was that “our culture is now in crisis because evil remains
an inescapable experience for all of us, while we no longer have a symbolic language for describing it.” Over the next week, Moyers’ wideranging discussions also included Harvard and CUNY professor and psychologist Robert Jay Lifton (“What does bin Laden really want?”) and
Farid Esack, a South African Muslim theologian and academic, who explained to a national audience that “Islam is a religion of peace” but “like
any religion is open to manipulation.” 2
Still, the reluctance of most contemporary Americans to even acknowledge the existence of evil - never mind speak at length about it stood as an uncharacteristically new development in the history of the
country, having slowly gained momentum throughout much of the twentieth century with the nation’s growing commitments to science and modernity, but acquiring a special urgency with the social and moral upheavals
of the 1960s. In Under God: Religion and American Politics, Gary Wills
points out that “evil as the threatening other has taken many forms” since
the founding of the republic. During the early days of the United States,
“it was the Whore of the Devil, the Church of Rome. More recently, it has
been Communism.” 3
A memorable case in point is President Ronald Reagan’s description of the former Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” offered during an
address before the annual convention of the National Association of
Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, on March 8, 1983. In the years since this
famous declaration, however, such unabashed judgments about good and
evil have often given way to more ironic expressions of black humour as
the preferred way for most Americans to cope with the darker aspects of
political life, especially on national television with the ascendancy of
shows such as Saturday Night Live (1975-) and comics such as David Letterman and Bill Maher. “If the privative conception of evil continues to be
lost between liberal irony on the one hand, and fundamentalist demonizing
on the other,” Delbanco continued, “we shall have no way of confronting
the most challenging experiences of our private and public lives.” 4
For his part, newly elected President George W. Bush stood
squarely on the conservative side of the country’s cultural divide at the
moment of the 9/11 attacks. As the Washington Post’s Mike Allen put it,
“September 11, 2001, was the unquestioned turning point in Bush’s presi-
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dency, silencing doubts about the disputed 2000 election, giving purpose
and clarity to the administration at a time when its policies seemed muddled, and temporarily narrowing the division in the nation whose voters
were split 50-50.” The immediate worldwide response to the terrorist hijackings was a general outpouring of goodwill towards the United States,
as well as a brief period of bipartisan cooperation at home. Candidate
Bush had even campaigned as a self-styled “compassionate conservative,”
promising “to unite and not divide,” especially in the wake of the Clinton
years which had ratcheted up “the modern age of the acrimoniously divided electorate” to its highest level ever. 5
Over the next six months, the Bush team succeeded in galvanising a majority of Americans around a “faith-based foreign policy” which
was designed to confront “evil” by waging a “just war,” recalled Howard
Fineman, chief political correspondent and senior editor of Newsweek.
Bush responded to the 9/11 crisis with a moral firmness and conviction
that temporarily assured a shaken nation and set a resolute path for many
citizens to follow. “As a born-again Christian, George W. Bush is the
most overtly religious president since Jimmy Carter. For him, that includes a very clear, very sturdy, almost joyful certainty about what’s right
and what’s wrong,” according to political analyst Brad Knickerbocker. As
noted by rhetorical scholar Joshua Gunn, Bush’s speeches after September
11 “closely model the Reaganesque purging of an exogenous evil, right
down to the justification of global action.” 6
The climactic example of Bush’s religiously informed post-9/11
political rhetoric came when he delivered his enthusiastically received
State of the Union address to Congress and an international television audience on January 29, 2002. The most remembered phrase from that fiftyminute speech was his naming of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis
of evil,” thus demonising those “regimes that sponsor terror” while also
linking them closely to the ill-fated German-Italian-Japanese triumvirate
of World War II. The effect of the telecast at home was electrifying, as
Bush’s job approval rating spiked to 89 percent the next day, up from 50
percent on September 10, 2001. The “terrorist attacks [had completely]
reshaped Bush’s presidency and his standing with [American] voters,”
reported David Broder and Dan Balz of the Washington Post. Television
additionally provided his administration as well as the country with a
powerful weapon by which to respond swiftly - if largely unreflectively to the crisis at hand. 7
As communication scholar Denise Bostdorff has observed, Bush
had essentially rallied a stunned nation “in the months immediately following September 11 [by] urg[ing] the younger generations of Americans
to uphold the faith of their ‘elders,’ the World War II generation,” by invoking Pearl Harbour and portraying bin Laden as the latest in a long line
of totalitarian tyrants. He evoked the memory of the last good and just war
that the United States had fought by identifying yet another “axis of evil”
to be confronted and defeated. “In a way, saying ‘evil is real,’” argued
Brad Knickerbocker, “also can be seen as a way of avoiding the ‘why do
they hate us?’ question. It allows one to fault ‘evildoers’ while U.S. poli-
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cies, hubris, and culture have nothing to do with what motivates terrorists.
It makes it easier to just say, ‘they hate freedom and our way of life.’” 8
Overall, then, this chapter considers the ways in which television
portrayed the major events of September 11 and its aftermath, particularly
in respect to the frame of reference provided by the president for understanding this unprecedented national crisis beginning in the first few days
after the hijackings and culminating in his 2002 State of the Union address
when he identified “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world.” Cognitive linguist George Lakoff has referred to metaphors such
as “axis of evil” as “conceptual mappings” that people use “to frame
moral issues: to interpret them, understand them, and explore their consequences.” He believes they “play an absolutely central role in our judgments about what is good behaviour and what is bad, what is the right
thing to do and what is wrong.” 9
Moreover, sociologists William Gamson and Andre Modigliani
define a media frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events.” On September 12, 2001,
for instance, Bush gave voice to the horrific spectacle of the attacks by
calling them “acts of war” and framing the conflict as “a monumental
struggle of good and evil.” Viewer attention was soon channelled into a
familiar narrative pattern featuring heroic public servants and villainous
foreign terrorists. This quickly emerging plotline was further enhanced by
the shocking repetitive power of seeing the World Trade Center towers
burning and finally collapsing time and again. 10
The collective memory of September 11 is now indistinguishably
linked with the way in which this day’s happenings were telecast continuously over four straight days to audiences in the hundreds of millions
worldwide. According to social theorists Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz,
“media events [such as 9/11] endow collective memory not only with substance but with a frame: they are mnemonics for organizing personal and
historical time.” Media critic Todd Gitlin similarly suggested that mediated frames permit journalists to quickly and efficiently package television
news for viewer consumption. As communication scholar Robert Entman
has observed, audiences make sense of these frames as “mentally stored
clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.” 11
In the specific case of September 11, the nation’s “political leader
can have high confidence that the press will echo [his message], as occurred here with President Bush,” concluded a team of communication
researchers from the University of Washington. “Indeed, our findings
show quite clearly that the press - at least the institutional voices of the
press - aligned remarkably with the President’s good/evil” pronouncements. 12 Most of all, this chapter hones in on Bush’s main televised responses, along with the various ways in which his administration’s faithbased foreign policy was initially framed on TV. Bush’s evangelical
Christian background is examined, as is the direction that his subsequent
political vision set for the country in waging its war on terrorism. Finally,
representative telecasts, broader programming patterns, and general viewing trends during the first six months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
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are surveyed and summarised, as are the longer-term consequences of
framing the global media event of September 11 in terms of good and evil.
2.

The Devil is in the Details

Church and state may be separate, but faith and politics are not.
-Nancy Gibbs 13
The first time that a nationwide television audience ever saw
Texas Governor George W. Bush give public testimony to his deeply held
Christian beliefs was on the evening of Monday, December 13, 1999,
when he and five other Republican candidates converged on the Des
Moines Civic Center to debate each other in anticipation of the Iowa caucuses, then only six weeks away. The most memorable “sound bite” of the
ninety-minute CNN-sponsored contest came when moderator John Bachman turned to candidate Bush and asked him which “political philosopher
or thinker do you most identify with and why?” Bush paused a moment
and replied, “Jesus Christ - because he changed my heart.” When Bachman followed up, “the viewer would like to know more on how he has
changed your heart,” Bush spontaneously added, “Well, if you don’t know
it’s going to be hard to explain. When you turn your heart and your life
over to Christ, when you accept Christ as a saviour, it changes your heart,
and changes your life and that’s what happened to me.” 14
Television pundits made much of these remarks during the postdebate analysis. Bush’s critics saw his comments as a cynical ploy to appeal to Church-going voters in the heartland. Campaign insiders, however,
viewed it differently. “I think it was instinctive and genuine,” explained
Doug Wead, an Assembly of God evangelist and former close aide and
advisor to Bush. “The media elite and non-evangelicals see that statement
and they think it’s calculated. The evangelicals know it’s not calculated.
They know it didn’t help him. So they tend to believe that it’s true.” 15
Bush’s strong religious convictions have now become a wellknown part of his personal profile. Particularly after 9/11, he has frequently made reference to God in his public pronouncements and increasingly framed his outlook in teleological terms. In addressing the National
Prayer Breakfast on February 6, 2003, for example, Bush alluded to
“things we can count on” and “the ways of Providence.” He assured his
audience that “events aren’t moved by blind change or chance. Behind all
of life and all of history, there’s a dedication and purpose, set by the hand
of a just and faithful God.” 16 Prior to September 11, 2001, Bush mainly
emphasised God’s role in his own personal transformation when he finally
decided to give up alcohol in May 1986 and turn his life around. After
9/11, though, the divine plan that he spoke about to the American people
took on a kind of civil religious frame of reference, while his own role
within this epical drama grew progressively more messianic in nature.
Bush’s sense of presidential calling can be traced back to the
days when he was Governor of Texas. On January 19, 1999, he and his
family, friends, and political supporters attended a sunrise service at the
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Highland Park United Methodist Church in Dallas preceding his second
inauguration. The previous November he had been re-elected in a landslide victory in which he garnered 69 percent of the vote, thus spurring
nationwide speculation that he would make a run for the White House in
2000. Senior pastor Mark Craig talked about Moses leading the Israelites
out of Egypt in his homily that morning. As he concluded, Craig peered
right at Bush: “America needs leaders who have the moral courage to do
what is right for the right reasons,” even though “it’s not always easy or
convenient for leaders to step forward.” Later that afternoon, Bush gathered some of his closest political advisors together in the governor’s mansion. Amongst them was Richard Land, President of the Southern Baptist
Convention, who recalls that one of “the things he said to us was ‘I believe that God wants me to be President.’” 17
Three months later, Bush recruited Michael Gerson to be his head
speechwriter. Gerson “majored in theology at Wheaton College in Illinois,
alma mater of evangelist Billy Graham,” before establishing his credentials on the national political scene as a skilled writer and reporter for U.S.
News & World Report. Bush was already adopting a rhetorical style similar to other evangelical politicians when Gerson joined his speechwriting
team in April 1999. In short order, Gerson drafted Bush’s announcement
for the presidency, his convention speech, his inaugural address, and most
of his “September 11-related speeches.” He also “changed [colleague
David] Frum’s phrase ‘axis of hatred’ to ‘axis of evil,’ broadening the
notion, making it more sinister, even wicked,” reports Bob Woodward of
the Washington Post. “In spare, Biblical cadence,” concurs Newsweek’s
Howard Fineman, Gerson’s speeches “proclaim Bush’s central themes of
individual compassion and faith-based strength and, since 9/11, an Armageddon-like struggle between good and evil.” 18
Bush proclaimed Friday, September 14, 2001, a National Day of
Prayer and Remembrance, for instance, featuring a televised ceremony at
Washington’s National Cathedral attended by the First Family, former
presidents Clinton, Bush Sr., Carter, and Ford, as well as members of
Congress, the Cabinet, and other prominent dignitaries. The Reverend
Billy Graham delivered a sermon that spoke about “evil as a mystery”
including “the horror, shock, and revulsion” of 9/11. He ended by calling
for “a spiritual renewal in America.” The president next made a brief emotional statement mixing comfort and condolence with a determined call to
arms: “Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not have
the distance of history, but our responsibility to history is already clear - to
answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” 19
According to former Bush policy advisor and speechwriter Frum,
“the language of good and evil - central to the war on terrorism - came
about naturally.” In response to several television commentators and editorialists who raised the possibility that the U.S. somehow deserved the
attacks, Bush consciously adopted “the term ‘evildoers’ to describe the
terrorists,” remembered Frum. “He wanted to cut that off right away and
make it clear that he saw absolutely no moral equivalence. So he reached
right into the Psalms for that word.” As historian Jackson Lears explained,
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U.S. President George W. Bush addressing the nation and the world hours
after the 9/11 attacks.
“To those who worry about the [president’s] frequent use of religious language, Bush supporters insist that the rhetoric of Providence is as American as cherry pie.” 20
Beginning on Tuesday morning September 11, 2001 and continuing through Friday evening September 14, viewers around the world
watched continuous TV coverage, mesmerised by the unthinkable images
they were seeing. Television brought home to Americans especially the
polarising effects of the post-Cold War world, including the backlash of
Islamic fundamentalism and the catastrophic dangers inherent in terrorist
attacks on targets within the United States. Quickly a formulaic narrative
emerged; ordinary police and firefighters took the lead as America’s unsung national heroes, while Osama bin Laden and the rest of al-Qaeda and
the Taliban rose up as villains. Bush’s most widely covered public pronouncements during the first few days after September 11 further imbued
the television presentation of events with an identifiable Christian resonance. On Sunday September 16, for example, the president told reporters

202

Televising 9/11 and Its Aftermath

that “this crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.” By the
next day, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer was compelled to
qualify Bush’s use of “the word ‘crusade’ with all its connotations of religious war,” especially as the State Department attempted “to rally Arab
nations to join an international coalition against the perpetrators” of the
terrorist attacks. 21
“Religious invocation [in turn] permeated the earliest breaking”
telecasts, recalled video producer and scholar Marusya Bociurkiw, as
“New York firefighters (the secular saints of the occasion)” stood “at attention as stretchers were carried out of the rubble.” After September 11,
“coverage of Bush and his leadership [became] more adulatory,” observed
investigative reporter Ken Auletta. Most news, public affairs, and even
entertainment shows, became much more patriotic in their look, tone, and
message. The “loose association between the authority of TV network
news and political authority” grew increasingly closer over the next six
months, as newscasts across the country sported redesigned “computergenerated logos, brass trumpetry, red-white-and-blue colour schemes, and
portentous newsreaders, not to mention [demonstrating regular] deference
to official spokespeople, marginalizing dissent, and adopt[ing] official
news agendas.” Television anchors, commentators, and reporters also took
to wearing flag lapel pins “to express their solidarity not merely with the
American government but with Americans feeling embattled and anxietyridden,” recounted media critic Pat Aufderheide. 22
Bush’s early success in framing the victims and perpetrators of
September 11 in terms of “innocent civilians” and “cowardly evildoers”
also exerted a chilling effect on the more irreverent political talk shows.
On the September 17 episode of ABC’s Politically Incorrect (1994-2002),
for example, author Dinesha D’Souza sparked controversy by disagreeing
with Bush’s use of the word “coward” to describe the 9/11 terrorists. Host
Bill Maher reacted quickly with characteristic brashness: “We have been
the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That’s cowardly. Staying in the plane when it hits the building, say what you want
about it, it’s not cowardly.” As a result, Maher was forced to backtrack for
the rest of the week. Sponsors Sears and Federal Express temporarily left
the programme because of a sharp surge in viewer complaints over the
remark. General Motors and Schering-Plough pulled their ads for good.
More strikingly, seventeen ABC affiliates refused to air Politically Incorrect any longer. 23 By September 21, a chastened Bill Maher felt compelled to appear on “the stage of The Tonight Show with Jay Leno . . .
seeking forgiveness for what might have been a career ending gaffe.” 24
Although Politically Incorrect survived through May 2002, and
the professional repercussions for Maher never proved fatal, White House
reaction was swift and unequivocal. On September 26, press secretary Ari
Fleisher called Maher’s comment “a terrible thing to say,” chiding all
Americans “to watch what they say, watch what they do. This is not a time
for remarks like that; there never is.” 25 For its part, network news was far
more inclined to steer clear of controversy and support the Bush administration during the first six months after 9/11, and the president responded
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in kind by favouring his most sympathetic TV news advocates such as Brit
Hume of Fox. According to Auletta, Bush granted lengthy interviews to
ABC’s Diane Sawyer, CBS’s Scott Pelley, and NBC’s Tom Brokaw but
refused similar requests from ABC’s Peter Jennings and CBS’s Dan
Rather. Jennings remembered researching a story at the White House and
being told by “a senior figure [that ‘i]t better be good.’” “I thought [that]
was rather naked,” recalled the veteran newscaster. “It wasn’t a threat, but
it didn’t sound like a joke,” either. 26
“It’s almost as if the media decided that critical analysis of the
events leading to and from 9/11 [was] not only un-American, but potentially anti-American,” asserted Australian communication scholar Leila
Green, “and consistent with this more consensual approach to newsgathering [was] a ready willingness to see a demonization of ‘the enemy’: bin
Laden, the Taliban, al-Qaeda.” 27 Reflective of the psychology of evil,
Bush and his administration had fixated on the intrinsic wickedness of
Osama bin Laden and his followers and the immorality of their violent
behaviour as the root causes of the horror visited on the nation and visible
for all to see on TV. In Bush’s September 20, 2001 address before a joint
session of Congress and a nationwide television audience exceeding 82
million Americans, he identified al-Qaeda “and its leader - a person
named Osama bin Laden . . . [as] Islamic extremis[ts who] hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.” Bush’s message was
crystal clear: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end
there . . . Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” 28 Evil “explains the
existence of perceived incomprehensible actions,” concludes political
theorist Jonathan Anderson, resulting in an “us v. them” world-view
which separates “certain people from the rest of humanity.” 29
Americans looked increasingly toward safe and comfortable entertainment on television as a brief respite from the nerve-racking urgency
of current events, particularly as the war on terrorism heated up with the
invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Bush announced to the nation that day that “the United States military has begun strikes against alQaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan.” 30 Television audiences received intermittent
glimpses of bin Laden through four separate videos telecast worldwide
over the next three months. The first two tapes aired initially on the Al
Jazeera Arabic-language network and showed a seemingly serene and
determined bin Laden calling for Muslims everywhere to join in the struggle against the United States. As a response, the Bush administration released a third video on December 13 after it was “found by the CIA in a
house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.” This tape showed “bin Laden boasting
about the attacks,” and demonstrated the U.S. Government’s intention “to
win the case against international terrorism in the court of public opinion.”
A fourth and final video appeared again on Al Jazeera on December 27,
showing a haggard though still defiant bin Laden. In retrospect, these four
tapes changed few hearts and minds, as attitudes about 9/11 had congealed
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months before, “based to a certain extent on [each side’s] need to believe
one way or another.” 31
Bush’s framing of the conflict personalised it from the outset. On
September 17, 2001, for instance, he promised to bring Osama bin Laden
to “justice” by ad-libbing on camera that “there’s an old poster out West, I
recall, that says, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’” 32 No wonder a vast majority
of Americans anticipated seeing bin Laden killed or in custody by the end
of major hostilities in Afghanistan. By the time of Bush’s first State of the
Union address on January 29, 2002, he and the members of his war cabinet were already thinking beyond bin Laden and Afghanistan, however.
The good news for his administration was that a nationwide Gallup poll at
the time indicated that “two-thirds of Americans sa[id] the U.S. [was]
winning the war, and only 6 percent sa[id] it was a mistake to get involved
in sending the military to Afghanistan.” 33 The bad news for Bush was that
a Christian Science Monitor/TIPP (TechnoMetrica Institute of Policy and
Politics) poll “found 87 percent of Americans saying that if bin Laden and
his top aides aren’t captured or killed, the U.S. failed in its primary war
objective.” 34
Bush was at least partially responsible for both the good and bad
poll numbers. Before a television audience of 52 million in the United
States alone, Bush utilised his 2002 State of the Union address to prepare
the country for further action to “overcome evil with greater good. And
we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.” He also used the address to
articulate his administration’s loosely evolving “just war” response to
9/11. Having suffered a treacherous attack, the United States “will lead by
defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere . . . Steadfast in our purpose, we press on.
We have known freedom’s price. We have shown freedom’s power. And
in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom’s victory.” “Combating evil is the basis for the ‘just war’ theories of Augustine
and Niebuhr,” wrote Jonathan Anderson, who also noted that, once the
evil has been identified, “any means to destroy it are acceptable, even
mandatory.” 35
Following Bush’s lead, patriotic expressions of all kinds were
readily apparent throughout the television environment in the six months
following the September 11 attacks. Many TV stations across the country
simply keyed in the image of a tiny American flag at the bottom righthand corner of their telecasts. The stars-and-stripes also became a familiar
background fixture on the CBS hit sitcom, Everybody Loves Raymond
(1996-2005). After six years on prime-time and being forced to switch
from NBC to CBS in 1997, JAG, a courtroom drama about a close-knit
group of lawyers in the U.S. Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps, finally rose to top-20 status during the 2001-02 TV season. Television additionally “made it a [regular] practice of airing long and patriotic half-time
shows at [football games] and [playing] the 7th inning rendition of “God
Bless America” at baseball games instead of cutting away to commercials.” “The most distressing post-Sept 11 trend,” in one TV critic’s opin-
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ion, however, was “the exploitation of patriotism in ads . . . Why is that
Jeep driving up the face of the Statue of Liberty? And is Chevy really just
trying to ‘keep America rolling?’” 36
The most obvious change in prime-time viewing after 9/11 was
the sudden loss of interest in quiz shows, especially the once wildly popular Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? (1999-2002), and the sudden rejection
of reality programmes, save Survivor (2000-) and a few others. “Reality
shows,” in particular, were “negatively affected,” remembered advertising
executive John Rash. After September 11, they “began to look remarkably
self-indulgent.” 37 In contrast, American audiences started choosing a tried
and true diet of TV comfort food. NBC’s Friends (1994-2004), for example, enjoyed its best ratings ever, ending first in the prime-time Nielsen
ratings and third in national syndication behind such perennial favourites
as Wheel of Fortune (1975-) and Jeopardy! (1964-). Other evergreen hits,
including Monday Night Football (1970-) and 60 Minutes (1968-), performed as well in 2001-02 as they had in years, as did cable channels specialising in nostalgic entertainment such as American Movie Classics,
Nick-at-Night, and TV Land.
On the whole, television news and entertainment programming
largely reflected the official view of reality as framed by Bush and his
administration during the first six months following September 11. A majority of Americans eagerly looked to the president for leadership and
guidance in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and TV in particular reinforced
Bush’s civil religious outlook, which included his faith as well as his politics. The president regularly called the country to arms during this time
period by invoking a higher power, inspiring a media frame that featured
the central organising idea of “good overcoming evil” and a story line
where the United States was not just waging “America’s fight . . . [but]
civilization’s fight.” In the words of Bush as heard on television sets
around the world, “Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution.
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies,
justice will be done.” 38
The expressions of unquestioning patriotic support across television news and entertainment programming began to fade somewhat after
the six-month commemoration of 9/11, as criticisms of the Bush administration’s handling of the war on terrorism slowly grew louder, bolder, and
far more frequent. By July 2001, “the rally-‘round-the-flag effect dissipated” slightly, leaving Bush’s poll numbers at a still noteworthy 70 percent, but clearly dropping. 39 On the news front, CNN correspondent
Christiane Amanpour admitted on the September 10, 2003 edition of
CNBC’s Topic A With Tina Brown that “certainly television - and perhaps
to a certain extent my station - was intimidated by the administration and
its foot soldiers at Fox News. And it did, in fact, put a climate of fear and
self-censorship, in my view, in terms of the kinds of broadcast work we
did.” 40
By February 2003, the public too had grown deeply conflicted
over the impending Iraqi crisis. According to reporters Patrick Tyler and
Janet Elder, a New York Times/CBS News poll showed that “three-
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quarters of Americans [saw] war as inevitable, and two-thirds approve[d]
of war as an option . . . [but] 59 percent of Americans said they believed
the president should give the United Nations more time. Sixty-three percent said Washington should not act without the support of its allies, and
56 percent said Mr. Bush should wait for United Nations approval.” More
startling was that Bush’s “overall job approval rating [was then] down to
54 percent from 64 percent just a month [earlier, or at] the lowest level
since the summer before the September 11 2001 attacks.” 41
Still, American-led forces invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, complete with more than 600 embedded reporters relaying jerky real-time
video images from the battlefield to an average viewership of seven million on CNN, MSNBC, and the Fox News Channel combined, up from
their usual joint total of two million. 42 The “shock and awe” campaign
unleashed on Iraq was also a made-for-TV spectacle designed to win audience approval as well as the war on the ground. During the first six
months after 9/11, the Bush administration and the American people harmoniously embraced a “just war” scenario together. Television was the
pivotal forum on which that tacit agreement between government policy
and public support was reached. Now a year and a half later, TV was
again the most prominent medium on which to see the “just war” story
line - only this time it led inevitably and inexorably to a highly contentious and controversial attack on Iraq.
3.

In the Name of Religion

The national coming together and one-size-fits-all patriotism that America
saw in the months that followed 9/11 is now a distant memory. In many
ways it has been Bush himself who shattered that comity.
-John Dickerson and Karen
Tumulty 43
John Rossant, the European editor for BusinessWeek, wrote on
the one-year anniversary of 9/11 that “already that crystal-clear September
morning is fast becoming an historical memory, the way some of us still
remember a November day in 1963 when gunning down a young American president seemed to mark the end of one age and the beginning of
another. We sense that history will divide into ‘before September 11’ and
‘after.’” 44 In Covering the Body, Barbie Zelizer similarly identified the
Kennedy assassination as a shared milestone for an earlier generation,
reassessing how journalists had utilised that tragic event at the time to
promote their own agendas and shape collective memory. 45 Many subsequent politicians, authors, and artists, such as filmmaker Oliver Stone in
JFK (1991), for instance, have revisited the Kennedy shooting from a
wide variety of perspectives. So too is the way in which 9/11 is already
being utilised on television - and is likely to continue to be used by all
sorts of vested interests in the future.
A case in point is the $10 million made-for-TV docudrama, DC
9/11: Time of Crisis, which premiered on Sunday, September 7, 2003, and
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A godlike George W. Bush (Timothy Bottoms) hovers above the Manhattan skyline in this poster for Lionel Chetwynd’s made-for-television film
DC 9/11: Time of Crisis. Copyright ¤ 2003 Showtime Networks Inc.
played in heavy rotation on Showtime throughout the remainder of the
month. Produced by journeyman writer-director Lionel Chetwynd, DC
9/11 recreates the first nine days following the terrorist attacks from the
inside perspective of Bush’s newly ordained war cabinet. “Chetwynd is
among the few outspokenly conservative producers in Hollywood, and
one of the few with close ties to the White House,” wrote Washington
Post reporter Paul Farhi. Chetwynd’s depiction of President Bush is unabashedly hagiographic in a script he wrote and later ran “past a group of
conservative Washington pundits, including Fred Barnes, Charles Krauthammer, and Morton Kondracke.” 46
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The climatic scene of DC 9/11 involves actor Timothy Bottoms
portraying George W. Bush as he presumably delivers his prime-time September 20 address to a joint session of Congress. Shots of Bottoms orating
before a podium are intercut with emotionally stirring documentary footage of 9/11, culminating in a shot of Bush finishing this very same televised speech on the actual occasion. All told, Chetwynd and his production crew framed events in DC 9/11 to authenticate and legitimise Bush as
America’s chief executive. They dramatised his performance as president
- fully supported by an able and gifted cabinet of advisors - thus reenacting their shared handling of the unprecedented challenges surrounding
September 11, 2001. If only 9/11 had unfolded as simply and heroically as
this television depiction.
In Media Representations of September 11, sociologists Steven
Chermak, Frankie Y. Bailey, and Michelle Brown described how 9/11
“has been narrativized by way of the media into a primary, recognizable
discourse, one with a distinct logic - a clear beginning (September 11,
2001), forceful middle (war), and moral end (victory).” 47 Especially during the first six months after 9/11, Americans mostly saw and heard only
one side of the story transmitted through their television sets. Problems
eventually arose when developments on the ground did not seamlessly
correspond with the official version of things as presented by Bush as the
principal spokesperson for his administration. Probably the clearest example of this growing disconnect between the Bush team’s framing of events
and the ensuing media coverage was the president’s carefully choreographed May 1, 2003 arrival on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln
off the coast of San Diego, California, in an S-3B Viking aircraft to announce the allied victory in the war with Iraq.
On that bright sunny day, Bush - dressed in a green flight suit
with a helmet tucked underneath his arm - stood smartly before TV cameras with a giant “Mission Accomplished” banner in the background.
Even at the time, the transparency of casting Bush as the lead character in
such an obvious made-for-television photo opportunity was criticised. Six
months later, however, more direct press attacks surfaced on all of the
major news networks because of the continuing violence in Iraq and the
failure to find any weapons of mass destruction. The situation was further
exacerbated on October 23, when Bush told reporters on camera that the
“Mission Accomplished” sign was conceived by the Navy, not the White
House. New press secretary Scott McClellan needed to qualify his boss’s
statement a week later when journalists found out otherwise. 48
Now years after the terrorist hijackings, the tide has obviously
turned in the various ways in which television represents 9/11 and the
subsequent war on terrorism. No longer is there unanimity of purpose and
opinion between the administration’s viewpoint and those who produce or
even watch the unfolding events related to the aftermath of 9/11 on their
television screens. Bush’s clear and simple framing of September 11 in
terms of “good overcoming evil” proved one of his greatest assets in forging an early response for a nation in which 40 percent of its citizens shared
his deeply held evangelical beliefs. 49 According to ethicist Peter Singer,
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Bush employed the word “evil” in reference to 9/11 in 319 speeches
through mid-June 2003. Furthermore, Bush used “evil” as a noun 83 percent of the time in those speeches and as an adjective only 17 percent. The
significance of his framing of the concept this way suggests that he “is not
thinking about evil deeds, or even evil people, nearly as he is thinking
about evil as a thing, or a force, something that has an existence apart
from the cruel, callous, brutal, and selfish acts of which human beings are
capable.” Singer concluded that Bush’s “readiness to talk about evil in this
manner raises the question of what meaning evil can have in a secular,
modern world.” 50
Bush’s particular viewpoint on evil is part of a longstanding fundamentalist Christian perspective in American culture. His use of the word
in respect to September 11 springs from his deep personal faith in both
Jesus Christ and the United States of America. “Bush’s world-view is extremely rigid, circumscribed by the good-versus-evil religious convictions
to which he has adhered since his recovery from alcohol seventeen years
ago,” explained conservative correspondent and historian, Richard
Brookhiser, in 2003. “Bush’s faith means that he does not tolerate, or even
recognise, ambiguity: there is an all-knowing God who decrees certain
behaviours, and leaders must obey.” Put another way, “Bush once famously told Senator Joe Biden, ‘I don’t do nuance,’” recalled Time’s senior columnist Joe Klein, “but the struggle against Islamic radicalism is a
festival of nuance. It is not quite a war, and it doesn’t yield easily to simple notions of good and evil, friend and foe.” 51
Bush’s nemesis, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda followers,
likewise reflect the general tendency of demonising their own archenemy
of choice - America - as the world’s “Great Satan.” Ironically, both camps
subscribed to a kind of caricatured “just war” scenario that George Lakoff
likened to a “classic fairy tale” structure where combat is personified in
two diametrically opposed nationalist figures (the “hero [being] moral and
courageous”; the “villain amoral and vicious”) who fight each other for
the purpose of settling moral accounts. In the first Persian Gulf War in
1991, Lakoff observed that the overriding media frame essentially presented a struggle between George H. W. Bush and Saddam Hussein. A
similar confrontation can be recognised in the media coverage after 9/11,
first pitting George W. Bush against bin Laden, and then shifting over to
Bush and Hussein in the run-up to the second Iraqi conflict commencing
in March 2003. Such simple melodramatics increasingly undercut the ability of TV programming to adequately encompass and frame the growing
complexities of the war on terrorism. As a result, the official “just war”
story line based on “good overcoming evil” began to rupture and unravel
under the weight of current events leading analysts such as Richard
Brookhiser to ask: “Does Bush have the imagination to lead a great war?
And even if he does, can he communicate it?” 52
“Questions about why people do bad things - sometimes unspeakably evil things - in the name of religion” also persisted. Scholar and
minister Charles Kimball explored this seeming paradox in When Religion
Becomes Evil, pinpointing five specific warning signs: an absolutist belief
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in one’s own faith as the only true path to God; blind obedience to dogma;
an apocalyptic vision of the future; using ends to justify the means; and a
willingness to wage holy war. All five of these indicators are wholly characteristic of al-Qaeda thinking and actions. America, too, needs to guard
against several of these excesses in prosecuting its war on terrorism. “The
challenges posed by religious diversity combined with the inescapable fact
of global interdependence are now as clear as the September sky over
New York that fateful day,” proclaimed Kimball, which is why theologians like him and secular humanists like Andrew Delbanco have begun the
slow and deliberate process of reformulating a more contemporary understanding of evil in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. 53 Still, much work needs
to be done.
What is clear in retrospect, though, is that the old-fashioned fundamentalist view of evil is inadequate in helping Americans make better
sense of 9/11 and what exactly can be done about it. The complexities
inherent in the attacks and the U.S. response to them do not fit neatly into
an “us v. them” story line. Similarly, the long-term effect of Bush’s “good
overcoming evil” pronouncements - echoed widely and unreflectively on
televisions around the world - was more to paper over than clarify the
causes of September 11. Evil deeds were committed on 9/11, but they
resulted from more than just the personal exploits of Osama bin Laden’s
surrogates. They also occurred because of broader, more systemic sociopolitical problems and controversies, such as widespread instability in
Afghanistan after the Soviet war ended in 1989, the unresolved and
chronic nature of the Middle East conflict between Israel and Palestine,
America’s steadfast support of Israel and the U.S. military presence in
Saudi Arabia, the failure of most domestic economies in the Arab world to
adequately provide job opportunities for their young adult male populations, and the profound economic, technological, and cultural changes
wrought by globalisation over the last generation.
What globalisation specifically has unleashed is a growing fundamentalist backlash from the guardians of tradition in virtually every
region on earth. In a sense, a transnational clash of civilisations is taking
place - a so-called “culture war” of global proportions - driven above all
else by religious orthodoxy. Moreover, this “culture war” is not only violent in nature but also increasingly suicidal. The terrorist acts committed
on September 11 are the most dramatic examples in the West so far of the
darker impulses of globalisation. Within this much broader context, then,
scholars as well as average citizens are still working out the longer-term
meaning of September 11 as an historical turning point. They are also
struggling to find a more globally informed sense of evil, which until now
has been mostly absent from the televising of 9/11 and its aftermath.
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